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Abstract 
 
 
 
Low-beta stocks deliver high average returns and low risk relative to high-beta stocks, 
an opportunity for professional investors to “arbitrage” away. We argue that beta-
arbitrage activity instead generates booms and busts in the strategy’s abnormal trading 
profits. In times of low activity, the beta-arbitrage strategy exhibits delayed correction, 
taking up to three years for abnormal returns to be realized. In stark contrast, when 
activity is high, prices overshoot as short-run abnormal returns are much larger and 
then revert in the long run. We document a novel positive-feedback channel operating 
through firm-level leverage that facilitates these boom and bust cycles. 
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I. Introduction 
The trade-off of risk and return is a key concept in modern finance. The simplest and 
most intuitive measure of risk is market beta – the slope in the regression of a security’s 
return on the market return. In the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965), market beta is the only risk needed to explain expected 
returns. More specifically, the CAPM predicts that the relation between expected return 
and beta, the security market line, has an intercept equal to the risk-free rate and a 
slope equal to the equity premium. 
 However, empirical evidence indicates that the security market line is too flat on 
average (Black 1972, Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014) and especially so during times of 
high expected inflation (Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho 2005), disagreement (Hong and 
Sraer 2014) and market sentiment (Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam 2013). These 
patterns are not explained by other well-known asset pricing anomalies such as size, 
value, and price momentum. 
 We study the response of arbitrageurs to this failure of the Sharpe-Lintner 
CAPM in order to identify booms and busts of beta arbitrage. In particular, we exploit 
the novel measure of arbitrage activity introduced by Lou and Polk (2014). They argue 
that traditional measures of such activity are flawed, poorly measuring a portion of the 
inputs to the arbitrage process, for a subset of arbitrageurs. Lou and Polk’s innovation 
is to measure the outcome of the arbitrage process, namely, the correlated price impacts 
that previous research has shown can generate excess return comovement in the spirit of 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003).1 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005), Greenwood and Thesmar (2011), Lou (2012) 
and Anton and Polk (2014). 
2 
 
 We first confirm that our measure of the excess return comovement, relative to a 
benchmark asset pricing model, of beta-arbitrage stocks (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) is correlated with 
existing measures of arbitrage activity. In particular, we find that time variation in the 
level of institutional holdings in low-beta stocks (i.e., stocks in the long leg of the beta 
strategy), the assets under management of long-short equity hedge funds, and aggregate 
liquidity together forecast/explain roughly 38% of the time-series variation in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. 
These findings suggest that not only is our measure consistent with existing proxies for 
arbitrage activity but also that no one single existing proxy is sufficient for capturing 
time-series variation in arbitrage activity. Indeed, one could argue that perhaps much of 
the unexplained variation in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 represents variation in arbitrage activity missed by 
existing measures. 
 After validating our measure in this way, we then forecast the cumulative 
abnormal returns to beta arbitrage. We first find that when arbitrage activity is 
relatively high (as identified by the 20% of the sample with the highest values of 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶), abnormal returns to beta-arbitrage strategies occur relatively quickly, within 
the first six months of the trade. In contrast, when arbitrage activity is relatively low 
(as identified by the 20% of the sample with the lowest values of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶), abnormal 
returns to beta-arbitrage strategies take much longer to materialize, appearing only two 
to three years after putting on the trade. 
 These effects are both economically and statistically significant. When beta-
arbitrage activity is low, the abnormal four-factor returns on beta arbitrage are 
statistically insignificant from zero in the six months after portfolio formation. For the 
patient arbitrageur, in year 3, the strategy earns abnormal three-factor returns of 0.85% 
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per month with a t-statistic of 2.95. In stark contrast, for those periods when arbitrage 
activity is high, the abnormal three-factor returns to beta arbitrage average 1.56% per 
month with a t-statistic of 3.09 in the six months after the trade. Indeed, the return 
differential in the first six months between high and low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods is 1.19% per 
month with a t-statistic of 2.14. 
 We then show that the stronger performance of beta-arbitrage activities during 
periods of high beta-arbitrage activity can be linked to subsequent reversal of those 
profits. In particular, the year 3 abnormal three-factor returns are -0.74% with an 
associated t-statistic of -2.15. As a consequence, the long-run reversal of beta-arbitrage 
returns varies predictably through time in a striking fashion. The post-formation, year-3 
spread in abnormal returns across periods of low arbitrage activity, when abnormal 
returns are predictably positive, and periods of high arbitrage activity, when abnormal 
returns are predictably negative, is -1.60%/month (t-statistic = -3.29) or more than 19% 
cumulative in that year. These short- and long-run return differentials across high and 
low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods barely change if we also control for exposure to the Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor. 
 Our results reveal interesting patterns in the relation between arbitrage returns 
and arbitrage crowd. When beta-arbitrage activity is low, the returns to beta-arbitrage 
strategies exhibit significant delayed correction. In contrast, when beta-arbitrage 
activity is high, the returns to beta-arbitrage activities reflect strong over-correction due 
to crowded arbitrage trading. These results are consistent with time-varying arbitrage 
activity generating booms and busts in beta arbitrage. 
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We argue that these results are intuitive, as it is difficult to know how much 
arbitrage activity is pursuing beta arbitrage, and, in particular, the strategy is 
susceptible to positive-feedback trading. Specifically, successful bets on (against) low-
beta (high-beta) stocks result in prices for those securities rising (falling). If the 
underlying firms are leveraged, this change in price will, all else equal, result in the 
security’s beta falling (increasing) further. Thus, not only do arbitrageurs not know 
when to stop trading the low-beta strategy, their (collective) trades strengthen the 
signal. Consequently, beta arbitrageurs may increase their bets precisely when trading is 
more crowded.2  
Consistent with our novel positive-feedback story, we show that the cross-
sectional spread in betas increases when beta-arbitrage activity is high and particularly 
so when beta-arbitrage stocks are relatively more levered. As a consequence, stocks 
remain in the extreme beta portfolios for a longer period of time. Our novel positive 
feedback channel also has implications for cross-sectional heterogeneity in abnormal 
returns; we find that our boom and bust beta-arbitrage cycles are particularly strong 
among high-leverage stocks. 
 A variety of robustness tests confirm our main findings. In particular, we show 
that controlling for other factors when either measuring 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 or when predicting beta-
arbitrage returns does not alter our primary conclusions a) that the excess comovement 
of beta-arbitrage stocks forecasts time-varying reversal to beta-arbitrage bets and b) 
that the beta spread varies with 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶.  
                                                          
2 Note that crowded trading may or may not be profitable, depending on how long the arbitrageur holds 
the position and how long it takes for any subsequent correction to occur. 
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Our findings can also be seen by estimating time variation in the short-run 
(months 1-6) and long-run (year 3) security market lines, conditioning on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. Thus, 
the patterns we find are not just due to extreme-beta stocks, but reflect dynamic 
movements throughout the entire cross section. In particular, we find that during 
periods of high beta-arbitrage activity, the short-term security market line strongly 
slopes downward, indicating strong profits to the low-beta strategy, consistent with 
arbitrageurs expediting the correction of market misevaluation. However, this correction 
is excessive, as the long-run security market line dramatically slopes upwards. In 
contrast, during periods of low beta-arbitrage activity, the short-term security market 
line is weakly upward sloping. During these low-arbitrage periods, we do not find any 
downward slope to the security market line until the long-run. 
A particularly compelling robustness test involves separating 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 into excess 
comovement among low-beta stocks occurring when these stocks have relatively high 
returns (i.e., capital flowing into low beta stocks and pushing up the prices) vs. excess 
comovement occurring when low-beta stocks have relatively low returns—i.e., upside 
versus downside comovement. Under our interpretation of the key findings, it is the 
former that should track time-series variation in expected beta-arbitrage returns, as that 
particular direction of comovement is consistent with trading aiming to correct the beta 
anomaly. Our evidence confirms this indeed is the case: our main results are primarily 
driven by upside 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. 
 Finally, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) link the extent of arbitrage activity to limits 
to arbitrage. Based on their logic, trading strategies that bet on firms that are cheaper 
to arbitrage (e.g., larger stocks, more liquid stocks, or stocks with lower idiosyncratic 
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risk) should have more arbitrage activity. This idea of limits to arbitrage motivates tests 
examining cross-sectional heterogeneity in our findings. We show that our results 
primarily occur in those stocks that provide the least limits to arbitrage: large stocks, 
liquid stocks, and stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility. This cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in the effect is again consistent with the interpretation that arbitrage 
activity causes much of the time-varying patterns we document. 
 The organization of our paper is as follows. Section II summarizes the related 
literature. Section III describes the data and empirical methodology. We detail our 
empirical findings in section IV, and present some additional results in Section V. 
Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Related Literature 
Our results shed new light on the risk-return trade-off, a cornerstone of modern asset 
pricing research. This trade-off was first established in the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, 
which argues that the market portfolio is mean-variance-efficient. Consequently, a 
stock’s expected return is a linear function of its market beta, with a slope equal to the 
equity premium and an intercept equal to the risk-free rate. 
However, mounting empirical evidence is inconsistent with the CAPM. Black, 
Jensen, and Scholes (1972) were the first to show carefully that the security market line 
is too flat on average. Put differently, the risk-adjusted returns of high beta stocks are 
too low relative to those of low-beta stocks. This finding was subsequently confirmed in 
an influential study by Fama and French (1992). Blitz and van Vliet (2007) and Baker, 
Bradley, and Taliaferro (2013), Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), and Blitz, Pang, and van 
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Vliet (2012) document that the low-beta anomaly is also present in both non-US 
developed markets as well as emerging markets.  
Of course, the flat security market line is not the only failing of the CAPM (see 
Fama and French 1992, 1993, and 1996). Nevertheless, since this particular issue is so 
striking, a variety of explanations have been offered to explain the low-beta 
phenomenon. Black (1972) and more recently Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) argue that 
leverage-constrained investors, such as mutual funds, tend to deviate from the capital 
market line and invest in high beta stocks to pursue higher expected returns, thus 
causing these stocks to be overpriced relative to the CAPM benchmark.3 
Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005) derive the cross-sectional implications of 
the CAPM in conjunction with the money illusion story of Modigliani and Cohn (1979). 
They show that money illusion implies that, when inflation is low or negative, the 
compensation for one unit of beta among stocks is larger (and the security market line 
steeper) than the rationally expected equity premium. Conversely, when inflation is 
high, the compensation for one unit of beta among stocks is lower (and the security 
market line shallower) than what the overall pricing of stocks relative to bills would 
suggest. Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho provide empirical evidence in support of their 
theory. 
Hong and Sraer (2014) provide an alternative explanation based on Miller’s 
(1977) insights. In particular, they argue that investors disagree about the value of the 
market portfolio. This disagreement, coupled with short sales constraints, can lead to 
overvaluation, and particularly so for high-beta stocks, as these stocks allow optimistic 
                                                          
3 See also Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2011) and Buffa, Vayanos, and Woolley (2014) for related 
explanations based on benchmarking of institutional investors. 
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investors to tilt towards the market. Further, Kumar (2009) and Bali, Cakici, and 
Whitelaw (2011) show that high risk stocks can indeed underperform low risk stocks, if 
some investors have a preference for volatile, skewed returns, in the spirit of the 
cumulative prospect theory as modeled by Barberis and Huang (2008). Related work 
also includes Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam (2013).4 
A natural question is why sophisticated investors, who can lever up and sell short 
securities at relatively low costs, do not fully take advantage of this anomaly and thus 
restore the theoretical relation between risk and returns. Our paper is aimed at 
addressing this exact question. Our premise is that professional investors indeed take 
advantage of this low-beta return pattern, often in dedicated strategies that buy low-
beta stocks and sell high-beta stocks. However, the amount of capital that is dedicated 
to this low-beta strategy is both time varying and unpredictable from arbitrageurs’ 
perspectives, thus resulting in periods where the security market line remains too flat—
i.e., too little arbitrage capital, as well as periods where the security market line 
becomes overly steep—i.e., too much arbitrage capital.  
Not all arbitrage strategies have these issues. Indeed, some strategies have a 
natural anchor that is relatively easily observed (Stein 2009). For example, it is 
straightforward to observe the extent to which an ADR is trading at a price premium 
(discount) relative to its local share. This ADR premium/discount is a clear signal to an 
arbitrageur of an opportunity and, in fact, arbitrage activity keeps any price differential 
                                                          
4 In addition, Campbell, Giglio, Polk, and Turley (2015) document that high-beta stocks hedge time-
variation in the aggregate market’s return volatility, offering a potential explanation for the low-beta 
anomaly. 
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small with deviations disappearing within minutes.5 Importantly, if an unexpectedly 
large number of ADR arbitrageurs pursue a particular trade, the price differential 
narrows. An individual ADR arbitrageur can then adjust his or her demand accordingly. 
There is, however, no easy anchor for beta arbitrage.6 Further, we argue that the 
difficulty in identifying the amount of beta-arbitrage capital is exacerbated by an 
indirect positive-feedback channel.7 Namely, beta-arbitrage trading can lead to the 
cross-sectional beta spread increasing when firms are levered. As a consequence, stocks 
in the extreme beta deciles are more likely to remain in these extreme groups when 
arbitrage trading becomes excessive. Given that beta arbitrageurs rely on realized beta 
as their trading signal, this beta expansion resulting from leverage effectively causes a 
potential feedback loop in the beta-arbitrage strategy.  
 
III. Data and Methodology 
The main dataset used in this study is the stock return data from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Following prior studies on the beta-arbitrage 
strategy, we include in our study all common stocks on NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ. 
We then augment this stock return data with institutional ownership in individual 
                                                          
5 Rösch (2014) studies various properties of ADR arbitrage. For his sample of 72 ADR home stock pairs, 
the average time it takes until a ADR/home stock price deviation disappears is 252 seconds. For an 
institutional overview of this strategy, see J.P. Morgan (2014). 
6 Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2006) use the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM to relate the cross-sectional 
beta premium to the equity premium. They show how the divergence of the two types of equity-premium 
measures implies a time-varying trading opportunity for beta arbitrage. Their methods are quite 
sophisticated and produce signals about the time-varying attractiveness of beta-arbitrage that, though 
useful in predicting beta-arbitrage returns, are still, of course, quite noisy. 
7 The idea that positive-feedback strategies are prone to destabilizing behaviour goes back to at least 
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990). In contrast, negative-feedback strategies like ADR 
arbitrage or value investing are less susceptible to destabilizing behaviour by arbitrageurs, as the price 
mechanism mediates any potential congestion. See Stein (2009) for a discussion of these issues. 
 
10 
 
stocks provided by Thompson Financial. We further obtain information on assets under 
management of long-short equity hedge funds from Lipper’s Trading Advisor Selection 
System (TASS). Since the assets managed by hedge funds grow substantially in our 
sample period, we detrend this variable. 
We also construct, as controls, a list of variables that have been shown to predict 
future beta-arbitrage strategy returns. Specifically, a) following Cohen, Polk, and 
Vuolteenaho (2005), we construct an expected inflation index, defined as the exponential 
moving average CPI growth rate over the past 100 months (where the weight on month 
N is given by 2/(n+1)); b) we also include in our study the sentiment index proposed 
by Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007); c) following Hong and Sraer (2014), we construct 
an aggregate disagreement proxy as the beta-weighted standard deviation of analysts’ 
long-term growth rate forecasts; finally, following Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), we use 
the Ted spread—the difference between the LIBOR rate and the US Treasury bill 
rate—as a measure of financial intermediaries’ funding constraints. 
We begin our analysis in 1970, as that year was when the low-beta anomaly was 
first recognized by academics.8 At the end of each month, we sort all stocks into deciles 
(in some cases vigintiles) based on their pre-ranking market betas. Following prior 
literature, we calculate pre-ranking betas using daily returns in the past twelve months. 
(Our results are similar if we use monthly returns, or different pre-ranking periods.) To 
account for illiquidity and non-synchronous trading, we include on the right hand side of 
the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, in addition to the 
                                                          
8 Though eventually published in 1972, Black, Jensen, and Scholes had been presented as early as August 
of 1969. Mehrling (2005) biography of Fischer Black details the early history of the low-beta anomaly. 
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contemporaneous excess market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the 
six coefficients from the OLS regression.  
We then compute pairwise partial correlations using 52 weekly returns for all 
stocks in each decile in the portfolio ranking period. We control for the Fama-French 
three factors when computing these partial correlations to purge out any comovement in 
stocks induced by known risk factors. We measure the excess comovement of stocks 
involved in beta arbitrage (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) as the average pairwise partial correlation in the 
lowest market beta decile. We focus on the low-beta decile as these stocks tend to be 
larger, more liquid, and have lower idiosyncratic volatility compared to the high-beta 
decile; thus, our measurement of excess comovement will be less susceptible to issues 
related to asynchronous trading and measurement noise.9 We operationalize this 
calculation by computing the average correlation of the three-factor residual of every 
stock in the lowest beta decile with the rest of the stocks in the same decile: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 1
𝑁
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝐿 , 𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟−𝑖𝐿 �𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑟, 𝑠𝑚𝑠, ℎ𝑚𝑝)𝑁
𝑖=1
, 
where 𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖
𝐿 is the weekly return of stock 𝑝 in the (L)owest beta decile, 𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟−𝑖
𝐿  is the 
weekly return of the equal-weight lowest beta decile excluding stock 𝑝, and 𝑁 is the 
number of stocks in the lowest beta decile. We have also measured 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 using returns 
that are orthogonalized not only to the Fama-French factors but also to each stock’s 
industry return or to other empirical priced factors, and our conclusions continue to 
hold. We present these and many other robustness tests in Table IV. 
                                                          
9 Our results are robust to measuring 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 using a pooled sample of high- and low-beta stocks (putting 
a negative sign in front of the returns of high-beta stocks), as well as the (minus) cross-correlation 
between high- and low-beta deciles.  
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In the following period, we then form a zero-cost portfolio that goes long the value-
weight portfolio of stocks in the lowest market beta decile and short the value-weight 
portfolio of stocks in the highest market beta decile. We track the cumulative abnormal 
returns of this zero-cost long-short portfolio in months 1 through 36 after portfolio 
formation. To summarize the timing of our empirical exercise, year 0 is our portfolio 
formation year (during which we also measure 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶), year 1 is the holding year, and 
years 2 and 3 are our post-holding period, to detect any (conditional) long-run reversal 
to the beta-arbitrage strategy. 
 
IV. Main Results 
We first document simple characteristics of our arbitrage activity measure. Table I 
Panel A indicates that there is significant excess correlation among low-beta stocks on 
average and that this pairwise correlation varies through time. Specifically, the mean of 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is 0.11 varying from a low of 0.03 to a high of 0.20. 
 Panel B of Table I examines 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶’s correlation with existing measures linked to 
time variation in the expected abnormal returns to beta-arbitrage strategies. We find 
that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is high when disagreement is high, with a correlation of 0.34. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is also 
positively correlated with the Ted spread, consistent with a time-varying version of 
Black (1972), though the Ted spread does not forecast time-variation in expected 
abnormal returns to beta-arbitrage strategies (Frazzini and Pederson 2014). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is 
negatively correlated with the expected inflation measure of Cohen, Polk, and 
Vuolteenaho. However, in results not shown, the correlation between expected inflation 
and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 becomes positive for the subsample from 1990-2010, consistent with 
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arbitrage activity eventually taking advantage of this particular source of time-variation 
in beta-arbitrage profits. There is little to no correlation between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 and sentiment. 
 Figure 1 plots 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 as of the end of each December. Note that we do not 
necessarily expect a trend in this measure. Though there is clearly more capital invested 
in beta-arbitrage strategies, in general, markets are also more liquid. Nevertheless, after 
an initial spike in 1972, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 trends slightly upward for the rest of the sample. 
However, there are clear cycles around this trend. These cycles tend to peak before 
broad market declines. Also, note that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is essentially uncorrelated with market 
volatility. A regression of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 on contemporaneous realized market volatility 
produces a loading of -0.23 with a t-statistic of -0.79. 
 Consistent with our measure tracking arbitrage activity, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is persistent 
through time. The autocorrelation of non-overlapping December observations is 0.1. 
Appendix Table A1 documents that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is also persistent in event time. Specifically, 
the correlation between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 measured in year 0 and year 1 for the same set of stocks 
is 0.29. In fact, year-0 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 remains highly correlated with subsequent values of 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 for the same stocks all the way out to year 3. The average value of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
remains high as well. Recall that in year 0, the average excess correlation is 0.11. We 
find that in years 1, 2, and 3, the average excess correlation of these same stocks 
remains around 0.07.10 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is essentially uncorrelated with a similar measure of excess comovement based on the fifth and 
sixth beta deciles. 
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IV.A. Determinants of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
To confirm that our measure of beta-arbitrage is sensible, we estimate regressions 
forecasting 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 with two variables that are often used to proxy for arbitrage activity. 
The first variable we use is the aggregate institutional ownership (Inst Own) of the low-
beta decile—i.e., stocks in the long leg of the beta strategy—based on 13F filings. We 
include institutional ownership as these investors are typically considered smart money, 
at least relative to individuals, and we focus on their holdings in the low-beta decile as 
we do not observe their short positions in the high-beta decile. We also include the 
assets under management (AUM) of long-short equity hedge funds, the prototypical 
arbitrageur. 
 All else equal, we expect 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 to be lower if markets are more liquid. However, 
as arbitrage activity is endogenous, times when markets are more liquid may also be 
times when arbitrageurs are more active. Indeed, Cao, Chen, Liang, and Lo (2013) show 
that hedge funds increase their activity in response to increases in aggregate liquidity. 
Following Cao, Chen, Liang, and Lo, we further include past market liquidity as proxied 
by the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor (PS liquidity) in our regressions to 
measure which channel dominates. 
All regressions in Table II include a trend to ensure that our results are not 
spurious. We also report specifications that include variables that arguably should 
forecast beta-arbitrage returns: the inflation, sentiment, and disagreement indices as 
well as the Ted spread. We measure these variables contemporaneously with 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 as 
we will be running horse races against these variables in our subsequent analysis. 
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 Regression (2) in Table II documents that all three variables (Inst Own, AUM, and PS liquidity) forecast 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, with an R2 of approximately 38%.11 Regressions (3) and 
(4) show that the extant predictors of beta-arbitrage returns are not highly correlated 
with 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. Only one potential predictor of beta-arbitrage profitability, the Ted 
spread, adds some incremental explanatory power, with the sign of the coefficient 
consistent with arbitrageurs taking advantage of potential time-variation in beta-
arbitrage returns linked to this channel. Indeed, as we show later, the Ted spread does a 
poor job forecasting beta-arbitrage returns in practice, perhaps because arbitrageurs 
have compensated appropriately for this potential departure from Sharpe-Lintner 
pricing. 
Overall, these findings make us comfortable in our interpretation that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is 
related to arbitrage activity and distinct from existing measures of opportunities in beta 
arbitrage. As a consequence, we turn to the main analysis of the paper, the short- and 
long-run performance of beta-arbitrage returns, conditional on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. 
 
IV.B. Forecasting Beta-Arbitrage Returns 
Table III forecasts the abnormal returns on the standard beta-arbitrage strategy as a 
function of investment horizon, conditional on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. Panel A examines Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor-adjusted returns while Panel B studies abnormal returns 
relative to the four-factor model of Carhart (1997). In each panel, we measure the 
average abnormal returns in the first six months subsequent to the beta-arbitrage trade, 
                                                          
11 We choose to forecast 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 in predictive regressions rather than explain 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 in contemporaneous 
regressions simply to reduce the chance of a spurious fit. However, Appendix Table A2 shows that R2s 
remain high in contemporaneous versions of these regressions. 
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and those occurring in years one, two, and three. These returns are measured 
conditional on the value of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 as of the end of the beta formation period. In 
particular, we split the sample into five 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 quintiles. 
 Pursuing beta arbitrage when arbitrage activity is low takes patience. Abnormal 
three-factor returns are statistically insignificant in the first year for the bottom four 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 groups. Abnormal returns only become statistically significant for the two lowest 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 groups in the second year. This statistical significance continues through year 3 
for the 20% of the sample where beta-arbitrage activity is at its lowest values. 
 These findings continue to hold if we also adjust for the momentum effect. In 
Panel B, four-factor beta-arbitrage alphas are indistinguishable from zero except in year 
3 for the lowest 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 group. In that period, the four-factor alpha is 0.54%/month 
with an associated t-statistic of 2.03.12 
However, as beta-arbitrage activity increases, the abnormal returns arrive sooner 
and stronger. For the highest 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 group, the abnormal four-factor returns average 
1.19%/month in the six months immediately subsequent to the beta-arbitrage trade. 
This finding is statistically significant with a t-statistic of 2.34. Moreover, the difference 
between abnormal returns in high and low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods is 1.16%/month with a t-
statistic of 2.08.  
 The key finding of our paper is that these quicker and stronger beta-arbitrage 
returns can be linked to subsequent reversal in the long run. Specifically, in year three, 
the abnormal four-factor return to beta arbitrage when 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is high is -1.04%/month, 
                                                          
12 We have also separately examined the long and short legs of beta arbitrage (i.e., low-beta vs. high-beta 
stocks). Around 40% of our return effect comes from the long leg, and the remaining 60% from the short 
leg. 
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with a t-statistic of -3.12. These abnormal returns are dramatically different from their 
corresponding values when 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is low; the difference in year 3 abnormal four-factor 
returns is -1.58%/month (t-statistic = -3.33). 
 Figure 2 summarizes these patterns by plotting the cumulative abnormal four-
factor returns to beta arbitrage during periods of high and low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. This figure 
clearly shows that there is a significant delay in abnormal trading profits to beta 
arbitrage when beta-arbitrage activity is low. However, when beta-arbitrage activity is 
high, beta arbitrage results in prices overshooting, as evidenced by the long-run reversal 
we document. We argue that trading of the low-beta anomaly is initially stabilizing, 
then, as the trade becomes crowded, turns destabilizing, causing prices to overshoot.13 
 
IV.C. Robustness of Key Results 
Table IV examines variations to our methodology to ensure that our finding of time-
varying reversal of beta-arbitrage profits is robust. For simplicity, we only report the 
difference in returns to the beta strategy between the high and low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 groups in the 
short run (months 1-6) and the long-run (year 3). For reference, the first row of Table 
IV reports the baseline results from Table III Panel B. 
 In row two, we conduct the same analysis for the sub-period before our sample 
(1927-1969). Of course, this sample not only predates the discovery of the low-beta 
anomaly but also is a period where there is much less arbitrage activity in general, at 
least explicitly organized as such. Thus, this period could be thought of as a placebo test 
                                                          
13 We postpone the discussion of conditional abnormal returns to beta arbitrage (as shown in the last row 
of Table II) to Section V.C. 
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of our story. Consistent with our paper’s explanation, we find no statistically significant 
link between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 and beta-arbitrage returns. 
Our remaining subsample analysis excludes potential outlier years. We find that 
our results remain robust if we exclude the tech bubble crash (2000-2001) or the recent 
financial crisis (2007-2009) from our sample. 
 In rows five through eight, we report the results from similar tests using extant 
variables linked to potential time variation in beta-arbitrage profits. None of the four 
variables are associated with time variation in long-run abnormal returns. Thus, our 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 measure has not simply repackaged an effect linked to an existing forecasting 
variable. 
 In rows nine through 16, we consider alternative definitions of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. In the 
ninth row, we control for UMD when computing 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. In row 10, we separate HML 
into its large cap and small cap components. In Row 11, we report results based on 
Fama and French (2015a, 2015b) five-factor returns. In Row 12, we perform the entire 
analysis on an industry-adjusted basis by sorting stocks into beta deciles within 
industries. Row 13 uses the correlation between the high-beta and low-beta deciles as a 
measure of arbitrage activity, with lower values indicating more activity.14 
Rows 14 and 15 split 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 into upside and downside components. Specifically, 
we measure the following 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑈 = 1
𝑁
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝�𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖
𝐿, 𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟−𝑖𝐿 �𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑟, 𝑠𝑚𝑠,ℎ𝑚𝑝, 𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝐿 > 𝑚𝑟𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚(𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝐿)�𝑁
𝑖=1
 
                                                          
14 We also compute 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 based on a pooled sample of high- and low-beta stocks, putting a negative sign 
in front of the returns of high-beta stocks. The results are similar. For example, after controlling for other 
confounding factors, the difference in three-factor alpha of beta arbitrage in year three after portfolio 
formation between high and low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods is -0.96%/month (t-statistic = -2.24), and that same 
different in four-factor alpha is -0.77%/month (t-statistic = -1.79). 
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷 = 1
𝑁
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝�𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖
𝐿, 𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟−𝑖𝐿 �𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑟, 𝑠𝑚𝑠,ℎ𝑚𝑝, 𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝐿 < 𝑚𝑟𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚(𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝐿)�𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Separating 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 in this way allows us to distinguish between excess comovement tied 
to strategies buying low-beta stocks (such as those followed by beta arbitrageurs) and 
strategies selling low-beta stocks (such as leveraged-constrained investors modeled by 
Black (1972)). Consistent with our interpretation, we find that only 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑈 forecasts 
time variation in the short- and long-run expected returns to beta arbitrage (whereas 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷 does not). 
 Rows 16-21 document that our results are robust to replacing 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 with 
residual 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. In particular, we orthogonalize 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 to measures of arbitrage activity 
in momentum and value (Lou and Polk 2014), the average correlation in the market 
(Pollet and Wilson 2010), the past volatility of beta-arbitrage returns, the volatility of 
market returns over the twelve-month period corresponding to the measurement of 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, and a trend. 
In all cases, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 continues to predict time-variation in year 3 returns. The 
estimates are always economically significant, with most point estimates larger than 
1%/month.15 Statistical significance is always strong as well, with most t-statistic larger 
than 3. Taken together, these results confirm that our measure of crowded beta 
arbitrage robustly forecasts times of strong reversal to beta-arbitrage strategies. 
                                                          
15 Though in some instances, difference in short-run abnormal returns across high and low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods 
are no longer statistically significant; the point estimates are always economically large. Moreover, some 
of the overcorrection corresponding to the long-run reversal may accrue in our formation period as the 
timing of our empirical exercise is somewhat arbitrary. It is certainly possible that the beta arbitrageurs 
we are interested in may use shorter formation periods when pursuing their particular version of the 
strategy. Also, in these instances, the peak in cumulative abnormal returns that we find does not exactly 
coincide with our somewhat arbitrary six-month window. 
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 In unreported results, we have also studied variation in beta-arbitrage profits 
linked to Inst Own (the aggregate institutional ownership of the low-beta decile), the 
only proxy for arbitrage activity available for the full sample, as well as the linear 
combination of the three variables implied by regression (2) in Table II. Institutional 
ownership is unable to pick up the long-run reversal we have linked to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. 
Interestingly, the fitted value of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 from regression (2) in Table II is able to pick up 
some of the reversal that is key to our paper, though the effect is not statistically 
significant. 
 In Table V, we report the results of regressions forecasting the abnormal four-
factor returns to beta-arbitrage spread bets, while controlling for other predictors of 
beta-arbitrage returns. Unlike Table II, these regressions exploit not just the ordinal but 
also the cardinal aspect of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. Moreover, these regressions not only confirm that our 
findings are robust to existing measures of the profitability of beta arbitrage, they also 
document the relative extent to which existing measures forecast abnormal returns to 
beta-arbitrage strategies in the presence of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. 
 Regressions (1)-(3) in Table V forecast time-series variation in abnormal beta-
arbitrage returns in months 1-6. Regression (1) confirms that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 strongly forecasts 
beta-arbitrage four-factor alphas over the full sample. Regression (2) then includes 
controls that are available over the entire sample. These include the inflation and 
sentiment indices, market volatility, and a version of Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho’s 
(2003) value spread for the beta deciles in question. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 continues to reliably 
describe time-variation in abnormal four-factor returns on the low-beta-minus-high-beta 
strategy, with only the sentiment index providing any additional explanatory power. 
21 
 
Over the shorter sample period where both aggregate disagreement and the Ted spread 
are available, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 retains its economic significance, but becomes marginally 
statistically significant in forecasting time-variation in the abnormal returns to the beta-
arbitrage strategy. 
 Regressions (4)-(6) of Table V forecast the returns on beta-arbitrage strategies in 
year 3. The message from these regressions concerning the main result of the paper is 
clear; 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 strongly forecasts a time-varying reversal regardless of the other 
forecasting variables included in the regression.  
 
IV.D. Predicting the Security Market Line  
Our results can also be seen from time variation in the shape of the security market line 
(SML) as a function of lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. Such an approach can help ensure that the time-
variation we document is not restricted to a small subset of extreme-beta stocks, but 
instead is a robust feature of the cross-section. At the end of each month, we sort all 
stocks into 20 value-weighted portfolios by their pre-ranking betas.16 We track these 20 
portfolio returns both in months 1-6 and months 25-36 after portfolio formation to 
compute short-term and long-term post-ranking betas, and, in turn, to construct our 
short-term and long-term security market lines. 
For the months 1-6 portfolio returns, we then compute the post-ranking betas by 
regressing each of the 20 portfolios’ value-weighted monthly returns on market excess 
returns. Following Fama and French (1992), we use the entire sample to compute post-
                                                          
16 We sort stocks into vigintiles in order to increase the statistical precision of our cross-sectional estimate. 
However, Appendix Table A3 confirms that our results are virtually identical if we instead sort stocks 
into deciles. 
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ranking betas. That is, we pool together these six monthly returns across all calendar 
months to estimate the portfolio beta. We estimate post-ranking betas for months 25-36 
in a similar fashion. The two sets of post-ranking betas are then labelled 𝛽1
1, ..., 𝛽20
1  and 
𝛽1
25, ..., 𝛽20
25. 
To calculate the intercept and slope of the short-term and long-term security 
market lines, we estimate the following cross-sectional regressions: 
short-term SML: 𝑋𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡1 = 𝑝𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡1 + 𝑠𝑝𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑡1𝛽𝑖1, 
long-term SML: 𝑋𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡25 = 𝑝𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡25 + 𝑠𝑝𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑡25𝛽𝑖25, 
where 𝑋𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡1  is portfolio 𝑝’s monthly excess returns in months 1 through 6, and 𝑋𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡25 
is portfolio 𝑝’s monthly returns in months 25 through 36. These two regressions then 
give us two time-series of coefficient estimates of the intercept and slope of the short-
term and long-term security market lines: (𝑝𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡
1, 𝑠𝑝𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑡1) and 
(𝑝𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡
25, 𝑠𝑝𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑡25), respectively. As the average excess returns and post-ranking 
betas are always measured at the same point in time, the pair (𝑝𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡
1, 𝑠𝑝𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑡1) fully 
describes the security market line in the short run, while (𝑝𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑡
25, 𝑠𝑝𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑡25) captures 
the security market line two years later. 
 We then examine how these intercepts and slopes vary as a function of our 
measure of beta-arbitrage capital. In particular, we conduct an OLS regression of the 
intercept and slope measured in each month on lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. As can be seen from 
Table VI, the intercept of the short-term security market line significantly increases in 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, and its slope significantly decreases in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. The top panel of Figure 3 shows 
this pattern graphically. During high 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶—i.e., high beta-arbitrage capital—periods, 
the short-term security market line strongly slopes downward, indicating strong profits 
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to the low-beta strategy, consistent with arbitrageurs expediting the correction of 
market misevaluation. In contrast, during low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶—i.e., low beta-arbitrage capital—
periods, the short-term security market line is weakly upward sloping and the beta-
arbitrage strategy, as a consequence, unprofitable, consistent with delayed correction of 
the beta anomaly. 
The pattern is completely reversed for the long-term security market line. The 
intercept of the long-term security market line is significantly negatively related to 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, whereas its slope is significantly positively related to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. As can be seen 
from the bottom panel of Figure 3, two years after high 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods, the long-term 
security market line turns upward sloping; indeed, the slope is so steep that the beta 
strategy loses money, consistent with over-correction of the low beta anomaly by 
crowded arbitrage trading. In contrast, after low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods, the long-term security 
market line turns downward sloping, reflecting eventual profitability of the low-beta 
strategy in the long run. 
 
V. Beta Expansion and Additional Analyses 
We perform a number of further analyses to provide additional support to our thesis 
that crowded arbitrage trading can potentially destabilize prices. 
 
V.A. Beta Expansion 
Beta arbitrage can be susceptible to positive-feedback trading. Successful bets on 
(against) low-beta (high-beta) stocks result in prices for those securities rising (falling). 
If the underlying firms are leveraged, this change in price will, all else equal, result in 
24 
 
the security’s beta falling (increasing) further.17 Thus, not only do arbitrageurs not 
know when to stop trading the low-beta strategy, their (collective) trades also affect the 
strength of the signal. Consequently, beta arbitrageurs may increase their bets precisely 
when trading becomes crowded and the profitability of the strategy has decreased.  
We test this prediction in Table VII. The dependent variable in columns (1) and 
(2) is the spread in betas across the high and low value-weight beta decile portfolios, 
denoted 𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑚, as of the end of year 1. The independent variables include lagged 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, the beta-formation-period value of 𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑚, the average book leverage 
quintile (𝐿𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐿𝑟) across the high and low beta decile portfolios, and an interaction 
between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 and 𝐿𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐿𝑟. 
The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the fraction of the stocks in the 
high and low beta decile portfolios that continue to be in these portfolios when stocks 
are resorted into beta deciles at the end of year 1 (denoted 𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐶𝑚). Note that since 
we estimate beta using 52 weeks of stock returns, the two periods of beta estimation 
that determine the change in 𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑚 and 𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐶𝑚 do not overlap. We include a 
trend in all regressions, but our results are robust to not including the trend dummy. 
Regression (1) in Table VII shows that when 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is relatively high, future 
𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑚 is also high, controlling for lagged 𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑚. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 forecasts an increase in 𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑚 of roughly 7%. Regression (2) 
shows that this is particular true when 𝐿𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐿𝑟 is also high. If beta-arbitrage bets 
were to contain the highest book-leverage quintile stocks, a one-standard deviation 
increase in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 would increase 𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑚 by nearly 10%.  
                                                          
17 The idea that, all else equal, changes in leverage drive changes in equity beta is, of course, the key 
insight behind Proposition II of Modigiliani and Miller (1958). 
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These results are consistent with a positive feedback channel for the beta-
arbitrage strategy that works through firm-level leverage. In terms of the economic 
magnitude of this positive feedback loop, we draw a comparison with the price 
momentum strategy. The formation-period spread for a standard price momentum bet 
in the post-1963 period is around 115%, while the momentum profit in the subsequent 
year is close to 12% (e.g., Lou and Polk, 2014). Put differently, if we attribute price 
momentum entirely to positive feedback trading, such trading increases the initial 
return spread by about 10% (12% divided by 115%) in the subsequent year, which is 
similar in magnitude to the positive feedback channel we document for beta arbitrage. 
Regressions (3) and (4) replace the dependent variable, 𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑚, with 
𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐶𝑚. Together, these regressions show that a larger fraction of the stocks in the 
extreme-beta portfolios remain in these portfolios when 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is relatively high and 
these portfolios are particularly levered. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is associated with the level of 𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐶𝑚 increasing by 1.6%. Regression (4) 
confirms that this effect is particularly strong when 𝐿𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐿𝑟 is also high. If beta-
arbitrage bets were to contain the highest book-leverage quintile stocks, a one-standard 
deviation increase in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 would increase 𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐶𝑚 by more than 6%. Table VII Panel 
B confirms that these results are robust to the same methodological variations as in 
Table IV. 
Table VIII turns to firm-level regressions to document the beta expansion our 
story predicts. In particular, we estimate panel regressions of subsequent changes in 
stock beta on lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles 
based on their market beta calculated using daily returns in the past 12 months. The 
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dependent variable is 𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑚𝐿𝑟, the change in stock beta from year t to t+1 (again, 
we use non-overlapping periods). In addition to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, we also include 𝐷𝑝𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑟, the 
difference between a stock’s beta decile rank and the average rank of 5.5 in year t. 
𝐿𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐿𝑟 is the book leverage of the firm, measured in year t. We also include all 
double and triple interaction terms of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, 𝐷𝑝𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑟, and 𝐿𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐿𝑟. Other control 
variables include the lagged firm size, book-to-market ratio, lagged one-month and one-
year stock return, and the prior-year idiosyncratic volatility. Time-fixed effects are 
included in Columns 3 and 4. Note that since 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is a time-series variable, it is 
subsumed by the time dummies in those regressions. 
In all four regressions, stocks with higher Distance have a lower 𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑚𝐿𝑟, 
consistent with mean reversion. Our main focus is on the triple interaction among 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, 𝐷𝑝𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑟, and 𝐿𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐿𝑟. This mean reversion effect is significantly dampened 
when 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 and 𝐿𝑟𝐿𝑟𝑝𝑝𝐿𝑟 are high. Taken together, these results are consistent with 
beta-arbitrage activity causing the cross-sectional spread in betas to expand. 
As a natural extension, our positive feedback channel suggests that booms and 
busts of beta arbitrage should be especially strong among more highly levered stocks. 
Figure 4 reports results where the sample is split based on leverage. Specifically, at the 
beginning of the holding period, we sort stocks into four equal groups using book 
leverage. For each leverage quartile, we compute the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 return spread – i.e., the 
difference in four-factor alpha to the beta arbitrage strategy between high and low 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods. Reported in the figure is the cumulative difference in the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 return 
spread between the highest and lowest leverage quartiles over the five years after 
portfolio formation.  
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As can be seen from the figure, the difference in the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 return spread rises 
substantially in the first twelve months, by nearly 23% (1.89%*12, t-statistic = 3.29). It 
then mostly reverses in the subsequent years. For example, the cumulative 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
return spread in years 3-5 is -19.8% (t-statistic = -2.19). This finding is consistent with 
our novel positive feedback channel facilitating excessive arbitrage trading activity that 
can potentially destabilize prices. 
 
V.B. Low Limits to Arbitrage 
We interpret our findings as consistent with arbitrage activity facilitating the correction 
of the slope of the security market line in the short run. However, in periods of crowded 
trading, arbitrageurs can cause price overshooting. In Table IX, we exploit cross-
sectional heterogeneity to provide additional support for our interpretation. All else 
equal, arbitrageurs prefer to trade stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility (to reduce 
tracking error), high liquidity (to facilitate opening/closing of the position), and large 
capitalization (to increase strategy capacity). As a consequence, we split our sample 
along each of these dimensions. In particular, we rank stocks into quartiles based on the 
variable in question (as of the beginning of the holding period); we label the quartile 
with the weakest limits to arbitrage as “Low LTA” and the quartile with the strongest 
limits to arbitrage as “High LTA.” Our focus is on the long-run reversal associated with 
periods of high 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. 
 The first two columns report results based on market capitalization, the third 
and fourth based on idiosyncratic volatility, and the final two based on liquidity. The 
first column of each pair shows the difference in four-factor alpha to the beta arbitrage 
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strategy between high 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods and low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods in months 1-6 while the 
second column shows the difference occurring in year 3. 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is an economically stronger predictor of abnormal returns to beta-
arbitrage strategies in months 1-6 for large stocks, stocks with low idiosyncratic 
volatility, and those with high liquidity. For each of the three proxies for low limits to 
arbitrage, we also find economically and statistically significant differences in the 
predictability of year 3 returns. In summary, Table IX confirms that our effect is 
stronger among stocks with weaker limits of arbitrage, exactly where one expects 
arbitrageurs to play a more important role. 
 
V.C. Conditional Attribution 
Give that beta is moving with 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, we also estimate conditional performance 
attribution regressions. The last rows of Table II Panel A and Table II Panel B report 
the results of those regressions. We find that the long-run reversal of beta-arbitrage 
profits remains; there sus again an economically large reversal of beta-arbitrage profits 
when 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is high. Figure 5 plots the conditional security market line in the short and 
long-run as a function of lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. It is easy to see from the figure our result that 
beta expansion and destabilization go hand-in-hand. 
 
V.D. Fresh versus Stale Beta 
Though beta-arbitrage activity may cause the beta spread to vary through time, for a 
feedback loop to occur, beta arbitrageurs must base their strategies on fresh estimates of 
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beta rather than on stale estimates. Consistent with this claim, we show that our 
predictability results decay as a function of beta staleness. 
We repeat the previous analysis of section IV.B, but replacing our fresh beta 
estimates (measured over the most recent year) with progressively staler ones. In 
particular, we estimate betas in each of the five years prior to the formation year. As a 
consequence, both the resulting beta strategy and the associated 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 are different for 
each degree of beta staleness. For each of these six beta strategies, we regress the four-
factor alpha of the strategy in months one-six and year three on its corresponding 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. 
Figure 6 plots the resulting regression coefficients (results for months 1-6 plotted 
with a blue square and results for year 3 plotted with a red circle) as a function of the 
degree of staleness of beta. The baseline results with the most recent beta are simply the 
corresponding figures from Table V. We find that both the short-run and long-run 
predictability documented in section IV.B decays as the beta signal becomes more and 
more stale. Indeed, strategies using beta estimates that are five years old display no 
predictability. These results are consistent with the feedback loop we propose.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
We study the response of arbitrageurs to the flatness (and in some cases downward 
sloping) of the security market line. Using an approach to measuring arbitrage activity 
first introduced by Lou and Polk (2014), we document booms and busts in beta 
arbitrage. Specifically, we find that when arbitrage activity is relatively low, abnormal 
returns on beta-arbitrage strategies take much longer to materialize, appearing only two 
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to three years after putting on the trade. In sharp contrast, when arbitrage activity is 
relatively high, abnormal returns on beta-arbitrage strategies occur relatively quickly, 
within the first six months of the trade. These strong abnormal returns then revert over 
the next three years. Thus, our findings are consistent with arbitrageurs exacerbating 
this time-variation in the expected return to beta arbitrage. 
 We provide evidence on a novel positive feedback channel for beta-arbitrage 
activity. Welch (2004) shows that firms do not issue and repurchase debt and equity to 
counteract the mechanical effect that stock returns have on their market leverage ratio. 
Since the typical firm is levered and given the mechanical effects of leverage on equity 
beta (Modigliani and Miller 1958), buying low-beta stocks and selling high-beta stocks 
may cause the cross-sectional spread in betas to increase. We show that this beta 
expansion occurs when beta-arbitrage activity is high and particularly so when stocks 
typically traded by beta arbitrageurs are particularly levered. Thus, beta arbitrageurs 
may actually increase their bets when the profitability of the strategy has decreased. 
Indeed, we find that the short-run abnormal returns to high-leverage beta-arbitrage 
stocks more than triples before reverting in the long run. 
 Interestingly, the unconditional four-factor alpha of beta arbitrage over typical 
holding periods for our 1970-2010 sample is close to zero, much lower than the positive 
value one finds for earlier samples. Thus, it seems that the response to Black, Jensen, 
and Scholes’s (1972) famous finding is right on average. However, our conditional 
analysis reveals rich time-series variation that is consistent with the general message of 
Stein (2010): Arbitrage activity faces a significant coordination problem for unanchored 
strategies that have positive feedback characteristics. 
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Table I: Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides characteristics of “𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,” the excess comovement among low beta stocks over the 
period 1970 to 2010. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their market beta 
calculated using daily returns in the past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and non-synchronous 
trading, we include on the right hand side of the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, 
in addition to the contemporaneous excess market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six 
coefficients from the OLS regression. Pairwise partial return correlations (controlling for the Fama-French 
three factors) for all stocks in the bottom beta decile are computed based on weekly stock returns in the 
previous 12 months. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the average pair-wise correlation between any two stocks in the low-beta 
decile in year 𝑡. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝐼𝐶𝐼 is the exponential moving average CPI growth rate over the past 100 months 
(where the weight on month N is given by 2/(n+1)), as constructed by Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho 
(2005). 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡 is the sentiment index proposed by Wurgler and Baker (2006, 2007). 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡 is 
the beta-weighted standard deviation of analysts’ long-term growth rate forecasts, as used in Hong and 
Sraer (2012). 𝑇𝑆𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑇 is the difference between the LIBOR rate and the US Treasury bill rate. Panel A 
reports the summary statistics of these variables. Panel B shows the time-series correlations among these 
key variables for the entire sample period. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 492 0.106 0.027 0.034 0.202 
Inflation 492 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.007 
Sentiment 492 0.007 0.937 -2.578 2.691 
Disagreement 348 4.423 0.897 3.266 7.338 
Ted Spread 312 0.567 0.412 0.127 3.443 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 Inflation Sentiment Disagreemt Ted Spread 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 1.000     
Inflation -0.336 1.000 
   
Sentiment -0.047 0.034 1.000 
  
Disagreement 0.339 -0.382 0.390 1.000 
 
Ted Spread 0.200 0.251 0.079 -0.135 1.000 
 
 
 
 
  
Table II: Determinants of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
 
This table reports regressions of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, described in Table I, on lagged variables plausibly linked to 
arbitrage activity. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their market beta 
calculated using daily returns in the past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and non-synchronous 
trading, we include on the right hand side of the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, 
in addition to the contemporaneous excess market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six 
coefficients from the OLS regression. The dependent variable in the regressions, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, is the average 
pairwise partial weekly return correlation in the low-beta decile over 12 months. 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝑡 𝑂𝑂𝐼 is the aggregate 
institutional ownership of the low-beta decile, 𝐶𝐴𝐴 is the logarithm of the total assets under management 
of long-short equity hedge funds. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝐼𝐶𝐼 is the exponential moving average CPI growth rate over the 
past 100 months (where the weight on month N is given by 2/(n+1)), as constructed by Cohen, Polk, and 
Vuolteenaho (2005). 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡 is the sentiment index proposed by Wurgler and Baker (2006, 2007). 
𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡 is the beta-weighted standard deviation of analysts’ long-term growth rate forecasts, as used 
in Hong and Sraer (2012). 𝑇𝑆𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑇 is the difference between the LIBOR rate and the US Treasury bill 
rate. We also include in the regression the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor (PS Liquidity). A trend 
dummy is included in all regression specifications. All independent variables are divided by their 
corresponding standard deviation, so that the coefficient represents the effect of a one-standard-deviation 
change in the independent variable on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. Standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
DepVar 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝑡 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝑡−1 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.012** 
 
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡−1  0.008***  0.005** 
  
[0.002] 
 
[0.002] 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑡   
-0.016* -0.005 
   [0.009] [0.004] 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡𝑡   
0.003 0.004 
   
[0.008] [0.021] 
𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡𝑡   0.007 0.006 
   [0.005] [0.013] 
𝑇𝑆𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑡   0.010*** 0.011** 
   [0.003] [0.005] 
𝑃𝑆 𝐿𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑡𝐿𝑡 0.007** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
     
TREND YES YES YES YES 
Adj-R2 0.152 0.382 0.372 0.441 
No. Obs. 357 180 357 180 
Table III: Forecasting Beta-arbitrage Returns with 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
 
This table reports returns to the beta arbitrage strategy as a function of lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. At the end of each 
month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their market beta calculated using daily returns in the 
past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and non-synchronous trading, we include on the right hand side 
of the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, in addition to the contemporaneous excess 
market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six coefficients from the OLS regression. All 
months are then classified into five groups based on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, the average pairwise partial weekly return 
correlation in the low-beta decile over the past 12 months. Reported below are the returns to the beta 
arbitrage strategy (i.e., to go long the value-weight low-beta decile and short the value-weighted high-beta 
decile) in each of the three years after portfolio formation during 1970 to 2010, following low to high 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. Panels A and B report, respectively, the average monthly three-factor alpha and Carhart four-
factor alpha of the beta arbitrage strategy. “5-1” is the difference in monthly returns to the long-short 
strategy following high vs. low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶; “5-1 Conditional” is the difference in conditional abnormal returns 
(i.e., allowing for risk loadings to vary as a function of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) following high vs. low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. T-statistics, 
shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 
5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
Panel A: Fama-French-Adjusted Beta-arbitrage Returns 
  Months 1-6 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Rank No Obs. Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
1 98 0.37% (1.21) 0.48% (1.92) 0.61% (2.05) 0.85% (2.95) 
2 99 -0.46% (-1.38) 0.10% (0.39) 0.69% (2.54) 0.07% (0.35) 
3 98 -0.41% (-1.23) -0.04% (-0.14) 0.45% (1.64) 0.43% (1.50) 
4 99 -0.27% (-0.90) -0.08% (-0.34) -0.27% (-0.90) -0.10% (-0.24) 
5 98 1.56% (3.09) 0.92% (2.12) -0.08% (-0.15) -0.74% (-2.15) 
5-1 
 
1.19% (2.14) 0.44% (0.92) -0.69% (-1.13) -1.60% (-3.29) 
5-1(Conditional) 0.77% (1.89) 0.05% (0.13) -0.93% (-1.56) -1.44% (-3.19) 
 
 
Panel B: Four-Factor Adjusted Beta-arbitrage Returns 
  Months 1-6 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Rank No Obs. Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
1 98 0.02% (0.08) 0.16% (0.61) 0.38% (1.23) 0.54% (2.03) 
2 99 -0.61% (-1.88) -0.18% (-0.72) 0.39% (1.40) -0.12% (-0.48) 
3 98 -0.60% (-1.84) -0.30% (-0.98) 0.15% (0.51) 0.22% (0.84) 
4 99 -0.56% (-1.80) -0.41% (-1.67) -0.60% (-1.92) -0.45% (-1.03) 
5 98 1.19% (2.34) 0.64% (1.50) -0.22% (-0.47) -1.04% (-3.12) 
5-1 
 
1.16% (2.08) 0.49% (1.03) -0.61% (-1.07) -1.58% (-3.33) 
5-1(Conditional) 0.56% (1.21) 0.18% (0.48) -1.12% (-2.22) -1.72% (-4.06) 
 
 
  
Table IV: Robustness Checks 
 
This table reports returns to the beta arbitrage strategy as a function of lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. At the end of each 
month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their market beta calculated using daily returns in the 
past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and non-synchronous trading, we include on the right hand side 
of the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, in addition to the contemporaneous excess 
market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six coefficients from the OLS regression. All 
months are then classified into five groups based on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, the average pairwise partial weekly return 
correlation in the low-beta decile over the past 12 months. Reported below is the difference in four-factor 
alpha to the beta arbitrage strategy between high 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods and low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods. Year zero is the 
beta portfolio ranking period. Row 1 shows the baseline results which are also reported in Table III. Row 2 
shows the same analysis for the earlier sample (1927-1969) as a placebo test. In rows 3 and 4, we exclude 
the tech bubble crash and the recent financial crisis from our sample. In rows 5-8, we rank all months based 
on the inflation index (Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho, 2005), sentiment index (Wurgler and Baker, 2006), 
aggregate analyst forecast dispersion (Hong and Sraer, 2014), and Ted Spread (Frazzini and Pedersen, 
2014), respectively. In row 9, we also control for the UMD factor in computing 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. In row 10, we 
control for both large- and small-cap HML in computing 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. In row 11, we control for the Fama-
French five factor model that adds profitability and investment to their three-factor model. In row 12, we 
perform the entire analysis on an industry-adjusted basis by sorting stocks into beta deciles within 
industries. In row 13, we instead measure the correlation between the high and low-beta portfolios, with a 
low correlation indicating high arbitrage activity. In Rows 14 and 15, we examine upside and downside 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, as distinguished by the median low-beta portfolio return. In Rows 16-21, we replace 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  with 
residual 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  from a time-series regression where we purge from 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 variation linked to, respectively, 
CoMomentum and CoValue (Lou and Polk, 2014), the average pair-wise correlation in the market, the 
lagged 36-month volatility of the BAB factor (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2013), market volatility over the past 
12 months, and a trend. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors 
corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
  
 
 
Four-Factor Adjusted Beta-arbitrage Returns 
 Months 1-6 Year 3 
 
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Subsamples 
Full Sample: 1970-2010 1.16% (2.08) -1.58% (-3.33) 
Early sample (Placebo test): 1927-1969 0.68% (1.37) 0.31% (0.71) 
Excluding 2001 1.01% (1.99) -1.57% (-3.41) 
Excluding 2007-2009 1.09% (2.00) -1.61% (-3.25) 
     
Other predictors of beta-arbitrage returns 
Inflation 0.45% (0.98) 0.10% (0.24) 
Sentiment 1.39% (2.99) 0.47% (0.83) 
Disagreement 0.63% (1.04) 0.59% (1.26) 
Ted Spread -0.54% (-0.79) -0.63% (-1.44) 
     
Alternative definitions of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
Controlling for UMD 0.89% (1.78) -1.63% (-3.55) 
Controlling for Large/Small-Cap HML  1.55% (2.55) -1.68% (-3.45) 
Controlling for FF Five Factors 0.85% (1.72) -1.28% (-2.61) 
Controlling for Industry Factors 0.93% (1.69) -1.32% (-2.95) 
Correl btw High and Low Beta Stocks 0.31% (1.02) -0.91% (-2.09) 
Upside 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 1.08% (2.06) -0.99% (-2.20) 
Downside 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 0.18% (0.30) -0.41% (-0.87) 
     
Residual 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶     
Controlling for CoMomentum 1.09% (1.98) -1.57% (-3.27) 
Controlling for CoValue 1.10% (1.97) -1.60% (-3.39) 
Controlling for MKT CORR 0.94% (1.94) -1.78% (-4.21) 
Controlling for Vol(BAB) 1.13% (2.29) -1.43% (-3.03) 
Controlling for Mktvol12 1.50% (2.44) -1.69% (-3.50) 
Controlling for Trend 1.13% (2.12) -1.65% (-3.54) 
  
Table V: Regression Analysis 
 
This table reports returns to the beta arbitrage strategy as a function of lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. At the end of each 
month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their market beta calculated using daily returns in the 
past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and non-synchronous trading, we include on the right hand side 
of the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, in addition to the contemporaneous excess 
market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six coefficients from the OLS regression. The 
dependent variable is the four-factor alpha of the beta arbitrage strategy (i.e., a portfolio that is long the 
value-weight low-beta decile and short the value-weighted high-beta decile). The main independent variable 
is 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, the average pairwise partial weekly three-factor residual correlation within the low-beta decile 
over the past 12 months. We also include in the regression the inflation index (Cohen, Polk, and 
Vuolteenaho, 2005), sentiment index (Wurgler and Baker, 2006), aggregate analyst forecast dispersion 
(Hong and Sraer, 2012), Ted Spread—the difference between the LIBOR rate and the US Treasury bill 
rate, the ValueSpread—the spread in log book-to-market-ratios across the low-beta and high-beta deciles, 
and the market volatility over the past 12 months. The first three columns examine returns to the beta 
arbitrage strategy in months 1-6, and the next three columns examine the returns in year 3 after portfolio 
formation. We report results based on Carhart four-factor adjustments. T-statistics, shown in brackets, are 
computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
DepVar Four-Factor Alpha to the Beta Arbitrage Strategy 
 Months 1-6 Year 3 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 0.189*** 0.211*** 0.201* -0.188*** -0.166*** -0.178*** 
 [0.069] [0.075] [0.118] [0.054] [0.050] [0.065] 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝐼𝐶𝐼  
0.001 0.004 
 
0.000 -0.003 
  [0.002] [0.004]  [0.001] [0.003] 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡  0.005*** 0.005**  
0.002 -0.001 
  
[0.002] [0.002] 
 
[0.002] [0.002] 
𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡   0.002   0.003 
   [0.003]   [0.003] 
𝑇𝑆𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑇   -0.005*   0.002 
   [0.003]   [0.002] 
𝑉𝐼𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑇  0.000 0.001  -0.005 -0.005 
  [0.003 [0.004]  [0.003] [0.003] 
𝐴𝑀𝑡𝑀𝐶𝐼12  -0.035 -0.045  0.006 -0.077 
  [0.099 [0.138]  [0.008] [0.085] 
       
Adj-R2 0.046 0.092 0.146 0.090 0.132 0.191 
No. Obs. 492 492 312 492 492 312 
 
Table VI: Predicting the Security Market Line 
 
This table reports regressions of the intercept and slope of the security market line on lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. At 
the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into vigintiles based on their market beta calculated using daily 
returns in the past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and non-synchronous trading, we include on the 
right hand side of the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, in addition to the 
contemporaneous excess market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six coefficients from 
the OLS regression. We then estimate two security market lines based on these 20 portfolios formed in each 
period: one SML using monthly portfolio returns in months 1-6, and the other using monthly portfolio 
returns in year 3 after portfolio formation. The post-ranking betas are calculated by regressing each of the 
20 portfolios’ value-weighted monthly returns on the corresponding market return. Following Fama and 
French (1992), we use the entire sample to compute post-ranking betas. The dependent variable in Panel A 
is the intercept of the SML, while that in Panel B is the slope of the SML. The main independent variable 
is 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, the average pairwise partial weekly three-factor residual correlation within the low-beta decile 
over the past 12 months. We also include in the regressions the inflation index, sentiment index, aggregate 
analyst forecast dispersion, and Ted Spread. Other (unreported) control variables include the 
contemporaneous market excess return, SMB return, and HML return. Standard errors, shown in brackets, 
are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 6 or 12 lags, as appropriate.  *, 
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: DepVar = Intercept of SML 
 Months 1-6 Year3 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 0.184** 0.207*** 0.158** -0.217*** -0.174*** -0.186*** 
 
[0.091] [0.057] [0.080] [0.058] [0.057] [0.062] 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝐼𝐶𝐼  0.001 0.001  0.000 -0.004 
  
[0.001] [0.002] 
 
[0.002] [0.003] 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡  
0.005*** 0.005** 
 
0.002 -0.001 
  
[0.001] [0.002] 
 
[0.002] [0.002] 
𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡   
0.000 
  
0.000 
   
[0.002] 
  
[0.003] 
𝑇𝑆𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑇   -0.003*   0.003 
   
[0.002] 
  
[0.002] 
Adj-R2 0.051 0.402 0.492 0.087 0.338 0.542 
No. Obs. 492 492 312 492 492 312 
 
Panel B: DepVar = Slope of SML 
 Months 1-6 Year3 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 -0.355*** -0.197*** -0.150* 0.238*** 0.194*** 0.180*** 
 [0.110] [0.058] [0.085] [0.074] [0.055] [0.065] 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝐼𝐶𝐼  
-0.001 -0.002 
 
0.000 0.003 
  
[0.001] [0.003] 
 
[0.002] [0.003] 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡  
-0.005*** -0.006*** 
 
-0.002 0.001 
  
[0.001] [0.002] 
 
[0.002] [0.002] 
𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑡   
0.000 
  
0.000 
   [0.003]   [0.003] 
𝑇𝑆𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑇   0.004*   -0.003 
   
[0.002] 
  
[0.002] 
Adj-R2 0.104 0.680 0.715 0.075 0.545 0.698 
No. Obs. 492 492 312 492 492 312 
Table VII: Beta Expansion, Time-Series Analysis 
 
This table examines time-series beta expansion associated with arbitrage trading. Panel A reports the 
baseline regression. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the beta spread between the high-beta 
and low-beta deciles (ranked in year 𝑡) in year 𝑡+1. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the 
fraction of stocks in the bottom beta decile ranked in year 𝑡 that remain in the bottom beta decile in year 
𝑡+1 (the two periods are non-overlapping). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the average pairwise partial weekly three-factor 
residual correlation within the low-beta decile over the past 12 months. 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑆 is a quintile dummy 
based on the average value-weighted book leverage of the bottom and top beta deciles. We also include in 
the regression an interaction term between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 and 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑆. Panel B reports a battery of robustness 
checks. The dependent variable in all rows is the beta spread between the high-beta and low-beta deciles in 
year 𝑡+1. Reported below is the coefficient on the interaction of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 and 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑆. Row 1 shows the 
baseline results which are also reported in Table III. In Rows 2 and 3, we exclude the tech bubble crash and 
the recent financial crisis from our sample. In Row 4, we also control for the UMD factor in computing 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. In Row 5, we control for both large- and small-cap HML in computing 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. In Row 6, we 
control for the Fama-French five factor model that adds profitability and investment to their three-factor 
model. In Row 7, we perform the entire analysis on an industry-adjusted basis by sorting stocks into beta 
deciles within industries. In Row 8, we instead measure the correlation between the high and low-beta 
portfolios, with a low correlation indicating high arbitrage activity. In Rows 9 and 10, we examine upside 
and downside CoBAR, as distinguished by the median low-beta portfolio return. In Rows 11-16, we replace 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  with residual 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  from a time-series regression where we purge from 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 variation linked 
to, respectively, CoMomentum and CoValue (Lou and Polk, 2014), the average pair-wise correlation in the 
market, the lagged 36-month volatility of the BAB factor (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2013), market volatility 
over the past 12 months, and a trend. Standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Baseline Regression 
DepVar 𝐶𝑆𝑡𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑡𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑡+1 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
𝐶𝑆𝑡𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑇 0.287*** 0.281***   
 [0.060] [0.058]   
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 1.539*** 0.504 0.598 -1.686 
 [0.518] [0.636] [1.916] [2.078] 
𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑆  -0.037***  -0.253*** 
  [0.012]  [0.043] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑆  0.423***  0.982*** 
 
 [0.126]  [0.281] 
     
Adj-R2 0.128 0.150 -0.002 0.077 
No. Obs. 492 492 492 492 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Panel B: Robustness Checks 
DepVar = 𝐶𝑆𝑡𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 
 
Estimate Std. Dev. 
Subsamples 
Full Sample:1970-2010 0.423*** [0.126] 
Excluding 2001 0.436*** [0.117] 
Excluding 2007-2009 0.242** [0.086] 
   
Alternative definitions of COBAR 
Controlling for UMD 0.466*** [0.123] 
Controlling for Large/Small-Cap HML 0.425*** [0.123] 
Controlling for FF Five Factors 0.437*** [0.155] 
Controlling for Industry Factors 0.516*** [0.162] 
Correl btw High and Low Beta Stocks 0.215*** [0.071] 
Upside 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 0.601*** [0.159] 
Downside 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 0.229* [0.125] 
   
Residual 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶   
Controlling for CoMomentum 0.323** [0.095] 
Controlling for CoValue 0.413*** [0.118] 
Controlling for MKT CORR 0.248** [0.087] 
Controlling for Vol(BAB) 0.394*** [0.117] 
Controlling for Mktvol12 0.435*** [0.158] 
Controlling for Trend 0.335*** [0.121] 
 
  
Table VIII: Beta Expansion, Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
This table reports panel regressions of subsequent changes in stock beta on lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. At the end of 
each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their market beta calculated using daily returns in 
the past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and non-synchronous trading, we include on the right hand 
side of the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, in addition to the contemporaneous 
excess market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six coefficients from the OLS 
regression. The dependent variable is the change in stock beta from year 𝑡 to 𝑡+1 (non-overlapping 
periods). The main independent variable is lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, the average pairwise excess weekly return 
correlation in the low-beta decile over the past 12 months. 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐹𝑆 is the difference between a stock’s beta 
decile rank and the average rank of 5.5 in year 𝑡. 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑆 is the book leverage of the firm, measured in 
year 𝑡. We also include all double and triple interaction terms of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐹𝑆, and 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑆. Other 
(unreported) control variables include lagged firm size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, idiosyncratic 
volatility (over the prior year), and the past one-month return. Time-fixed effects are included in Columns 
3 and 4. (Since 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is a time-series variable, it is subsumed by the time dummies.) Standard errors, 
shown in brackets, are double clustered at both the firm and year-month levels. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
DepVar 𝐶𝑆𝑡𝐼 𝐶ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐷𝑆𝑡+1 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 0.408*** 0.322***   
 
[0.151] [0.153] 
  
𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐹𝑆 -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.077*** -0.078*** 
 
[0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐹𝑆 0.078** 0.038 0.022 0.001 
 
[0.041] [0.048] [0.021] [0.048] 
𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑆  
-0.007*** 
 
-0.005*** 
  
[0.002] 
 
[0.002] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑆  
0.043*** 
 
0.027* 
  [0.016]  [0.016] 
𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑆 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐹𝑆  
0.000 
 
0.000 
  [0.001]  [0.001] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑆𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑆 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐹𝑆  
0.017*** 
 
0.013*** 
  
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
     
Time Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.216 0.219 0.279 0.282 
No. Obs. 1,056,219 1,056,219 1,056,219 1,056,219 
 
  
Table IX: Limits to Arbitrage 
 
This table reports returns to the beta arbitrage strategy as a function of lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 in various 
subsamples ranked by proxies for limits to arbitrage (LTA). At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted 
into deciles based on their market beta calculated using daily returns in the past 12 months. To account for 
illiquidity and non-synchronous trading, we include on the right hand side of the regression equation five 
lags of the excess market return, in addition to the contemporaneous excess market return. The pre-ranking 
beta is simply the sum of the six coefficients from the OLS regression. All months are then classified into 
five groups based on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, the average pairwise partial return correlation in the low-beta decile over the 
past 12 months. Reported below is the difference in four-factor alpha to the beta arbitrage strategy between 
high 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods and low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods. Year zero is the beta portfolio ranking period. “Low LTA” 
corresponds to the subsample of stocks with low limits to arbitrage, and “high LTA” corresponds to the 
subsample with high limits to arbitrage. “Low-High” is the difference in monthly portfolio alpha between 
the two subsamples. We measure limits to arbitrage using three common proxies. In columns 1-2, we rank 
stocks into quartiles based on market capitalization (as of the beginning of the holding period); we label the 
top quartile as “Low LTA” and the bottom quartile as “High LTA.” In columns 3-4, we rank stocks into 
quartiles based on idiosyncratic volatility with regard to the Carhart four-factor model (as of the beginning 
of the holding period); we label the bottom quartile as “Low LTA” and the top quartile as “High LTA.” In 
columns 5-6, we rank stocks into quartiles based on the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) (as of the 
beginning of the holding period); we label the bottom quartile as “Low LTA” and the top quartile as “High 
LTA.” T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-
dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
 
Market Cap Idiosyncratic Volatility Illiquidity 
 
Months 1-6 Year 3 Months 1-6 Year 3 Months 1-6 Year 3 
Low LTA 1.29% -1.67% 1.64% -1.67% 1.30% -1.58% 
 
(2.43) (-3.17) (3.03) (-3.36) (2.23) (-2.94) 
High LTA 0.12% -0.36% 0.90% -1.02% 0.31% -0.47% 
 
(0.24) (-0.59) (1.02) (-1.81) (1.32) (-0.85) 
Low-High 1.17% -1.31% 0.74% -0.65% 1.00% -1.11% 
 
(2.03) (-2.05) (-1.77) (2.05) (1.79) (-2.02) 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: This figure shows the time series of the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 measure. At the end of each month, all stocks are 
sorted into deciles based on their market beta calculated using daily returns in the past 12 months. To 
account for illiquidity and non-synchronous trading, we include on the right hand side of the regression 
equation five lags of the excess market return, in addition to the contemporaneous excess market return. 
The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six coefficients from the OLS regression. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the 
average pairwise partial return correlation in the low-beta decile measured in the ranking period. We begin 
our analysis in 1970, as that year was when the low-beta anomaly was first recognized by academics. The 
time series average of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is 0.11, and the autocorrelation in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is 0.1. 
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Figure 2: This figure shows returns to the beta arbitrage strategy as a function of lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. At the 
end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their market beta calculated using daily 
returns in the past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and non-synchronous trading, we include on the 
right hand side of the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, in addition to the 
contemporaneous excess market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six coefficients from 
the OLS regression. All months are then sorted into five groups based on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, the average pairwise 
weekly three-factor residual correlation within the low-beta decile over the previous 12 months. The red 
curve shows the cumulative Carhart four-factor alpha to the beta arbitrage strategy (i.e., a portfolio that is 
long the value-weight low-beta decile and short the value-weighted high-beta decile) formed in high 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
periods, whereas the dotted blue curve shows the cumulative Carhart four-factor alpha to the beta 
arbitrage strategy formed in periods of low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. 
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Figure 3: This figure shows the security market line as a function of lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. At the end of each 
month, all stocks are sorted into vigintiles based on their market beta calculated using daily returns in the 
past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and non-synchronous trading, we include on the right hand side 
of the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, in addition to the contemporaneous excess 
market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six coefficients from the OLS regression. We 
then estimate two security market lines based on these 20 portfolios formed in each period: one SML using 
portfolio returns in months 1-6, and the other using portfolio returns in year 3 after portfolio formation; the 
betas used in these SML regressions are the corresponding post-ranking betas. The Y-axis reports the 
average monthly excess returns to these 20 portfolios, and the X-axis reports the post-ranking betas of 
these portfolios. Beta portfolios formed in high 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods are depicted with a blue circle and fitted 
with a solid line, and those formed in low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods are depicted with a red triangle and fitted with a 
dotted line. The top panel shows average excess returns and betas to the beta-arbitrage strategy in months 
1-6 after portfolio formation, while the bottom panel shows average excess returns and betas in year 3 after 
portfolio formation. 
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Figure 4: This figure shows how the relation between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 and subsequent beta arbitrage returns varies 
with firm leverage. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their market beta 
calculated using daily returns in the past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and non-synchronous 
trading, we include on the right hand side of the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, 
in addition to the contemporaneous excess market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six 
coefficients from the OLS regression. All months are then sorted into five groups based on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, the 
average pairwise weekly three-factor residual correlation within the low-beta decile over the previous 12 
months. At the beginning of the holding period, we sort stocks into four equal groups using book leverage. 
For each leverage quartile, we compute the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 return spread – i.e., the difference in Carhart four-factor 
alpha to the beta arbitrage strategy (i.e., a portfolio that is long the value-weight low-beta decile and short 
the value-weighted high-beta decile) between high and low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods. The solid red curve shows the 
cumulative difference in the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 return spread between the highest and lowest leverage quartiles over 
the five years after portfolio formation. This difference in the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 return spread is 1.89%/month (t-
statistic = 3.29) in year one, and is –0.55%/month (t-statistic = -2.19) in years three-five. 
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Figure 5: This figure shows the conditional security market line as a function of lagged 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (i.e., where 
betas are allowed to vary with 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶). At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into vigintiles based 
on their market beta calculated using daily returns in the past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and 
non-synchronous trading, we include on the right hand side of the regression equation five lags of the excess 
market return, in addition to the contemporaneous excess market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply 
the sum of the six coefficients from the OLS regression. We then estimate two conditional security market 
lines based on these 20 portfolios: one SML using portfolio returns in months 1-6, and the other using 
portfolio returns in year 3 after portfolio formation; the betas used in these SML regressions are the 
corresponding post-ranking betas. The Y-axis reports the average monthly excess returns to these 20 
portfolios, and the X-axis reports the post-ranking beta of these portfolios. Beta portfolios formed in high 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 periods are depicted with a blue circle and fitted with a solid line, and those formed in low 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
periods are depicted with a red triangle and fitted with a dotted line. The top panel shows average excess 
returns and betas to the beta arbitrage strategy in months 1-6 after portfolio formation, while the bottom 
panel shows average excess returns and betas in year 3 after portfolio formation. 
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Figure 6: This figure shows how the information in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 about time-variation in the expected holding 
and post-holding return to beta-arbitrage strategies decays as staler estimates of beta are used to form the 
beta-arbitrage strategy. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their market 
beta calculated using daily returns in the past 12 months. To account for illiquidity and non-synchronous 
trading, we include on the right hand side of the regression equation five lags of the excess market return, 
in addition to the contemporaneous excess market return. The pre-ranking beta is simply the sum of the six 
coefficients from the OLS regression. We then compute the strategy return as the value-weight low-beta 
decile return minus the value-weight high-beta decile return. We separately regress the abnormal return of 
the beta-arbitrage strategy in months one-six and year three on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. In this process, we first use a fresh 
estimate of beta, calculated using daily returns in the past 12 months. We then repeat the analysis using 
stale betas, computed from daily returns in each of the prior 5 years (thus having different beta portfolios 
as of time zero for each degree of beta staleness). We plot the corresponding regression coefficients (results 
for months 1-6 plotted with a blue square and results for year 3 plotted with a red circle) for each of the six 
beta-arbitrage strategies, ranging from fresh beta to five years stale beta. The top (bottom) panel reports 
results based on three-factor (four-factor) alpha. 
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